Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2004

STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. TAN
JA RYNHART, Defendant and Respondent.: Brief
of Petitioner
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Christine F. Soltis; Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General;
Attorneys for Petitioner.
James M. Retallick; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Rynhart, No. 20040115.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2497

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
TAN JA RYNHART,

Case No. 20040115-SC

Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
UTAH SUPREME COURT
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
4S.9
59

DOCKET N0.22£iL2iLkl^.

JAMES M. RETALLICK
BOX ELDER PUBLIC DEFENDER
2564 Washington Blvd., Ste |0J
Ogden, Utah 84401-2564

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS (3039)
MARIAN DECKER (5688)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorneys General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Attorney for Respondent
Attorneys for Petitioner
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

NOV 0 8 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
TANJA RYNHART,

Case No. 20040115-SC

Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JAMES M. RETALLICK
BOX ELDER PUBLIC DEFENDER
2564 Washington Blvd., Ste 101
Ogden, Utah 84401-2564

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS (3039)
MARIAN DECKER (5688)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorneys General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Attorney for Respondent
Attorneys for Petitioner

d 1 A l li ur

ui/\n

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
,0""'

tXmi^k

FILED

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS
NOV ! g 2004
M A R K L.

SHURTLEFF

ATTORNEY GENERAL
RAY HINTZE

KIRK TORGENSEN

Chief Deputy - Civil

Chief Deputy - Criminal

November 18,2004
Sue Richards
Case Manager
UTAH SUPREME COURT
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City5 Ut 84114-0230
Re: State v. Tanja Rynhart,
Case No. 20040115-SC
Dear Ms. Richards:
Attached please find amended copies of the table of contents for the State's Brief
of Petitioner filed with the court on November 8, 2004 in the above named case. There
was one paragraph missing from the table which is the overall statement of the State's
argument in this brief. Sorry for the inconvenience.
Sincerely,
^LeeNakamura
Criminal Appeals Division

cc:

James M. Retallick
Jon Bunderson

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
:

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITI1 -'«

iii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW .

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RUL1 -

7

s I ' M I : M I < N r < » i n u < ( ASI<:

z

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..

6

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT FORFEITED ANY REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY WHEN SHE LEFT HER PURSE IN PLAIN VIEW IN HER
UNLOCKED VEHICLE IN A MARSH AND FAILED TO NOTIFY THE
PROPERTY OWNER OR PO* TPT7 o r JHF DAMAGE SHE HAD CAUSED

7

(A)
law

8

• -,:'.-• • '•

' .'« i' tiirtii

Intendment

conn \i

> . . \/;//i7 "• >m pn>t\t

iv

(B) The Rynhart majority erroneously applied property law standards, rather
than proper Fourth Amendment analysis

10

(C) The Rynhart majority erroneously focused on defendant's future intent,
rather than the objective reasonableness of her actions and conduct at the time
of the search

15

(D) Under proper analysis, the evidence establishes that defendant forfeited any
reasonable expectation of privacy in her van and purse when she left it unlocked
and in open view on another's property for over five and one-half hours

18

CONCLUSION

22

I

ADDENDA
Addendum A - State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, 81 P.3d 814
Addendum B - Trail Court's Memorandum Decision
Addendum C - Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-32 (West 2004)

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I

TABLE OF CONTENTS
i Aim

!

:•. i! S

iii

JURISDIC; I ION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

.

IS SUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

CONSTI I C I I IONAL PR 0"\ ISIONS S I \ I I ) I ES, t \ I'M I) R I JI ES

2

STA'I EN IEN r OF I I IE C ^ SE

-

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMEN T

,6

AR GUMEN r
(A) 'Abandonment" in the Fourth Amendment context is distinct from property
law
. .
' (B) The Rynhart majority erroneously applied property i aw stundanh, rather
than proper Fourth Amendment analysis
,
, ,
(C) The Rynhart majority erroneously focused on defendant's future intent,
rather than the objective reasonableness of her actions and conduct at the time
of the search .
(D) Under proper analysis, the evidence establishes that defendant forfeited any
reasonable expectation of privacy in her van and purse when she left it unlocked
and in open view on another ys property for over five and one-half hours
CONCLUSION

8
11)

7

^

18
22

i

ADDENDA
Addendum A - State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT App. 410, 81 P.3d 814
Addendum B - Trail Court's Memorandum Decision
Addendum C - Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-32 (West 2004)

u

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157(1986)

8, 19
14

Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d 697 (8th Cir.),
cert, denied, 382 U.S. 946 (1965)

14

Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)

8

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)

7, 8, 9

Linscomb v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 199 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1952)

14

Rakasv. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128(1978)

7, 8

Rowlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980)

8, 9

United States v. v4w^m, 66 F.3d 1115 (10th Cir. 1995),
cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1084(1996)
United States v. Barlow, 17 F.3d 85 (5th Cir.),
cerf. dewed, 513 U.S. 850(1994)

19
17, 19

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164(1974)

14

United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561 (10th Cir. 1991),
cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1102(1992)

19

United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1986)
United States v. Perkins, 871 F. Supp. 801 (M.D. Pa. 1995)
United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449 (7th Cir.),
cert, denied, 124 S. Ct. 128(2003)
United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert, denied, 450 U.S. 1030(1981)
United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
iii

17, 19
17

17
9, 16
15

United States v. Tugwell, 125 F.3d 600 (8th Cir. 1997),
cert denied, 522 U.S. 1061 (1998)

16, 17

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)

12,21

STATE CASES
Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1988)

14

Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 52 P.3d 1158

11

Cormney v. Commonwealth, 943 S.W.2d 629 (Ky. App. 1996)

20

Godfrey v. United States, 408 A.2d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1979)

16

Muegelv. State, 272N.E.2d 617 (Ind. 1971)

21

Narian v. State, 556 A.2d 1158 (Md. App. 1989),
cert, denied, 562 A.2d718 (Md. 1989)

15, 16

O'Shaughnessey v. State, 420 So. 2d 377 (Fla. App. 1982)

14

People v. Contreras, 210 Cal. App 3d 450, 259 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. App. 1989)

17

State v. Anderson, 548 N.W.2d 40 (S.D. 1996)

20

State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992)

11, 12, 13
14

State v. Brunson, 111 P.2d 938 (Kan. App. 1989)
State v. Bullock, 699P.2d753 (Utah 1985)

20, 21
14

State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1994)

4

State v. Hansen., 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650

14

State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995)

1

State v. James, 2000 UT 80, 13P.3d576

1
iv

State v. K. W., 832 So. 2d 803 (Fla. App. 2002)

14

State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911

4

State v. Lemacks, 268 S.E.2d 285 (S.C. 1980)
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

21
2

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992)
State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, 81 P.3d 814
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996)

10, 12, 13, 14, 15
passim
11

State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1997)

4

State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, 6 P.3d 1133

2

State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 76 P.3d 1159

11

FEDERAL STATUTES
U.S. Const. Amend. IV

2
STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. §41-6-32 (West 2004)

10, 18

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West 2004)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (West 2004)

1

OTHER WORKS CITED
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure (3rd ed. 1996)

v

8

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:

v.

:

TANJA RYNHART,

:

Defendant/Respondent.

Case No. 20040115-SC

:

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Court granted certiorari to review State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, 81 P.3d
814 (opinion attached in Addendum A\ which reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress (ruling attached in Addendum B). Jurisdiction exists under UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) & -2(5) (West 2004).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did defendant forfeit a reasonable expectation of privacy in her minivan and its
contents when she left the vehicle wrecked and unlocked on another's property and failed to
notify the property owner or police of the damage she had caused?
On certiorari review, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not the
decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). "The
correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately reviewed

the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." State v. James, 2000 UT
80, Tf 8, 13 P.3d 576. In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court's
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and its factual findings are reviewed for clear
error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936-939 & n.4 (Utah 1994); State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62,
Tf 8, 6 P.3d 1133.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, an enhanced second degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii), (4)(a) (West 2004), and
possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 5837a-5 (West 2004). Following a preliminary hearing on 29 May 2002, defendant was bound
over for trial. R15; R72:15. Defendant subsequently moved to suppress drugs seized
pursuant to a warrantless search of her purse, which she left inside her wrecked minivan on
another's private property. R24-27. The same judge who conducted the preliminary hearing
conducted the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. R72-73. Because the judge
was familiar with the essentially undisputed evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing, the

2

suppression hearing was abbreviated. R73. The trial court denied the motion to suppress,
ruling that defendant had not "abandoned" her vehicle or its contents, but that the warrantless
search was otherwise justified under the emergency aid doctrine. R44-48 (Add. B).
Defendant successfully petitioned the court of appeals for interlocutory review. A
majority of the court of appeals' panel reversed the trial court's ruling. See Rynhart, 2003
UT App 410, \ 18 (Add. A). The majority concluded that the trial court's underlying findings
were clearly erroneous and failed to support the trial court's determination that there was an
emergency or that the emergency aid doctrine applied. See id. at 113 (citing Salt Lake City
v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, If 12, 994 P.2d 1283). In a footnote, the majority addressed
the State's alternative ground for affirmance—that defendant forfeited any reasonable
expectation of privacy in the minivan and its contents after leaving the vehicle wrecked and
unlocked on another's property. See id. at % 9 n.3. The majority first opined that the State
had not preserved the issue because it had not cross-appealed on the alternative ground, but
then rejected the argument on its merits by affirming the trial court's conclusion that
defendant retained a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle and its contents. See id.
The dissent agreed that the emergency aid doctrine did not justify the warrantless
search, but disagreed with the majority's conclusion that "[defendant] maintained a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the minivan and its contents when, following a single
car accident, she left it, unsecured and parked on property not owned by [defendant]." See
id. at Tf 20 (Thorne, J., concurring and dissenting). The dissent first noted that the State was

3

under "no duty" to cross appeal because an appellate court is "permitted to affirm the trial
court's order—in this case the denial of the motion to suppress—on any grounds apparent
from the record, even if the trial court addressed the ground [relied] upon in a subsidiary
ruling." Id. at ^f 20 n. 1. Turning to the merits, the dissent criticized the majority's reliance
on cases having "little or nothing to do with the issue of abandonment." See id. atfflf21-23.
The majority's flawed abandonment standard "fl[ew] in the face of widely accepted
abandonment analysis for Fourth Amendment purposes" and failed to consider the totality
of the circumstances supporting the State's alternative theory. See id. atfflf20,24 n.4 & 35
n.8. The dissent concluded that defendant forfeited any legitimate expectation of privacy in
her vehicle and her purse left on its floor when she failed to take "normal precautions to
maintain her privacy" and left the vehicle unlocked on another's private property for over
five and one-half hours without notifying the property owner or police of the accident. See
id. atfflf24 & 31-36 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the
dissent concluded that the trial court had correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress,
through not under the correct theory. See id. at ^f 39.
The State timely petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 1

!

On certiorari, this Court applies the same standard of review applied by the court
of appeals, that is, it reviews the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the denial
of defendant's motion to suppress. See State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^ 3, 985 P.2d 911;
State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 5
(UtahApp. 1994);
4

About 8:30 a.m., on 6 January 2002, Officer Bumham of the Brigham City Police
Department received a dispatch report of an abandoned or wrecked vehicle in a field. R72:23. Arriving at the scene of what appeared to be an accident, Officer Burnham saw a minivan
"out in the middle of a swamp." R72:3. The minivan had "traveled over the curb [of West
Forest Street], down an embankment," and "through two fences" before coming to rest "out
in the marsh." Id. It had snowed at approximately 3:00 a.m. that morning and the tire tracks
of the van were snow covered. Officer Burnham surmised that the accident occurred at least
five and one-half hours earlier, sometime prior to 3:00 a.m. R72:4.
The officer walked down the embankment to the wrecked vehicle, but saw no one
outside the minivan. R72:4-5. He opened the van's unlocked door and looked inside to see
if he could determine the identify of the van's owner and/or driver and to determine "if
anybody was in the vehicle at all." R72:4-5; R73:10. No one was inside, but the officer
observed a briefcase on the front passenger seat and a purse on the floor. Id. He opened the
purse and located defendant's driver's license, as well as $329 in cash and "a small bag that
had a white powdery substance in it." Id. He observed a partially full bottle of vodka in the
console area between the two front seats. Id.
Officer Burnham tried unsuccessfully to reach defendant by telephone. R72:4-5,7-8.
The owner of the field arrived at the scene a few minutes later; he wanted the minivan
removed from his property so he could repair his damaged fences. R72:5-6; R73:10. At
approximately 9:35 a.m., Officer Burnham arranged for the van to be towed off the property.
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R72:6; R73:13. Before it was removed, Officer Burnham "look[ed] through the entire
vehicle for any valuables," noted the purse and briefcase, but did not otherwise prepare a
written inventory of the van's contents. R72:7-8; R73:l 1-13. Officer Burnham was at the
scene for one and one-half hours or until approximately 10:00 a.m. R73:13. During that
time, defendant did not return to her vehicle or otherwise contact the property owner or
police. R72:4, 7-8.
Approximately four hours later, around 2:00 p.m., the tow company contacted Officer
Burnham and told him that defendant was trying to recover the minivan. R72:6. Officer
Burnham met defendant at the wrecking yard and asked her about the baggie he had found
in her purse. Defendant "kind of laughed and said [she had forgotten] about that" and
claimed the cocaine belonged to a friend. R72:7.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not objects. Consequently, whether a
particular object is entitled to constitutional protection depends on its nature, its use, its
location, and the reasonableness of a defendant's expectation that it would be free from
warrantless governmental intrusion. The same object may be constitutionally protected in
one location, but not protected in another. Similarly, an object may be constitutionally
protected at one point in time, but not protected at another. Nevertheless, the inquiry for
Fourth Amendment purposes is always whether—at the time of the search—the defendant
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place and object to be searched, which

6

expectation was objectively reasonable given the totality of the surrounding circumstances,
including defendant's words, actions, and conduct.
Here, defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in her van or purse at the
time of the police search. Defendant left the scene of an accident without notifying the
property owner or police as required by statute. She left her vehicle in a swampy marsh on
another's property. She did not lock the vehicle's doors or otherwise secure her personal
possessions. Because she did not safeguard the vehicle or its contents, she forfeited any
reasonable expectation that either would be protected from invasion. Because any passer-by
had open access to the vehicle and purse, defendant cannot complain that the police had
equal access. In sum, the search of defendant's minivan and purse did not implicate the
Fourth Amendment.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT FORFEITED ANY REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY WHEN SHE LEFT HER PURSE IN PLAIN VIEW IN HER
UNLOCKED VEHICLE IN A MARSH AND FAILED TO NOTIFY THE
PROPERTY OWNER OR POLICE OF THE DAMAGE SHE HAD
CAUSED
In Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, \ 9 n.3, the majority held that defendant did not
"abandon" her expectation of privacy in her minivan and purse and, therefore, the Fourth
Amendment applied. Concluding that no exception justified the warrantless search, the
majority reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. Id. at ^f 18. For
the reasons discussed below, the decision is erroneous.
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(A) "Abandonment" in the Fourth Amendment context is distinct from
property law.
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not objects or places. See Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128,133-34 (1978); Katzv. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). As a result,
the amendment is only marginally concerned with property rights. 1 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 2.1(a), at 377 (3rd ed. 1996) [hereafter LaFave],

Instead, the

protection of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether a person's words, actions, and
conduct demonstrate a subjective intent to keep her activities and/or possessions private and
whether that subjective intent is objectively reasonable given the totality of the surrounding
circumstances. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n. 12. Consequently, "what a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. "The police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their
eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the
public." California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988).
A person may have an expectation of privacy in an object or place, but forfeit that
expectation through her words, actions, and conduct. Id. at 39-40 (refusing to recognize a
privacy interest in trash left on the street). Prior to Rakas, courts commonly referred to this
as "abandonment."

See, e.g.9 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924).

"Abandonment," however, is a term of art with a distinct meaning in property law, that is,
"the relinquishing of a right or interest with the intention of never again claiming it."
BlackJs Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). Rakas made clear that such "arcane concepts of
8

property law" do not control Fourth Amendment analysis. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98, 105 (1980).
"The distinction between abandonment in the property-law sense and abandonment
in the constitutional sense is critical to a proper analysis of the issue." LaFave at 574
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
In the law of property, the question . . . is whether the owner has voluntarily,
intentionally, and unconditionally relinquished his interest in the property so
that another, having acquired possession, may successfully assert his superior
interest
In the law of search and seizure, however, the question is whether
the defendant has, in discarding the property, relinquished his reasonable
expectation of privacy so that its seizure and search is reasonable within the
limits of the Fourth Amendment. . . . In essence, what is abandoned is not
necessarily the defendant's property, but his reasonable expectation of privacy
therein.
Id. Consequently, "even an inadvertent leaving of effects in a public place, whether or not
an abandonment in the true sense of the word, can amount to a loss of any justified
expectation of privacy." LaFave at 575-76. Fourth Amendment privacy expectations will
vary with the type of property involved as well as the location of the property at the time of
the search. See LaFave at 579. See, e.g., Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105-06 (recognizing that
even through Rawlings owned the drugs in question, he forfeited any legitimate expectation
of privacy when he placed them in his companion's purse); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (noting that
what a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected"); United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149, 1154 (4th Cir.
1980) ("What is a reasonable expectation of privacy is by definition related to time, place and
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circumstance.5'), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981).
(B) The Rynhart majority erroneously appliedproperty law standards, rather
than proper Fourth Amendment analysis.
The State has never contested defendant's ownership of the minivan and purse. Nor
has it contested the legitimacy of defendant's expectation of privacy in the van and purse at
the time of the accident. The State challenges only the reasonableness of defendant's
expectation of privacy at the time of the search.
In the trial court and the court of appeals, the State contended that defendant forfeited
any legitimate expectation of privacy in the van and purse when she left the purse in open
view on the floor of the unlocked van in the middle of a marsh on another's property and did
not notify the police or property owner of the damage she had caused as statutorily required.
R44-46; Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, Tf 9 n.3. See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-32 (West
2004) (imposing a duty on a driver who damages unattended property to locate and notify the
property owner of the damage or to "attach securely in a conspicuous place on the vehicle,"
a note with the driver's name and address) {Addendum C).
The trial court agreed with the State as to what factually occurred, but nevertheless
concluded that "the State had failed to carry its burden to show abandonment." R46 (Add. B).
Quoting State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 736 (Utah App. 1991), rev 'd on other grounds, 850
P.2d 427 (Utah 1992), the trial court concluded that the evidence was not "clear, unequivocal
and decisive" that defendant intended to "abandon" the vehicle when she left it in the field.
R46. The court noted that while there was evidence of the path and location of the van (the
10

van went over the street curb, down an embankment, and came to rest in a swampy marsh
in the middle of a field), but not whether it was drivable. If drivable, the trial court believed
the officer may have been justified in viewing the van as "abandoned." Id. But if damaged,
the court opined that defendant may not have had time to arrange for its retrieval given the
early hour of the accident and winter conditions. Id. After concluding that the van was not
"abandoned," the trial court denied the motion to suppress on other grounds. R46-47.
Defendant sought and was granted interlocutory review of the denial. In the court of
appeals, the State argued the merits of the trial court's ruling, but additionally argued that the
denial could be sustained on the alternative ground that defendant lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the van and purse at the time of the search. See Brief of Appellee,
No. 20020760-CA, at 18-21. A majority of the court of appeals' panel initially refused to
consider the merits of the State's alternative argument on procedural grounds, but then
considered and rejected its merits.2 See Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, f 9 n.3.
2

The majority initially concluded that the State's failure to cross-appeal on the
"abandonment" theory precluded review of its merits. See Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, ^f
9 n.3. The dissent correctly pointed out that the State had no obligation to cross-appeal
when it had won below, albeit on a different theory. The dissent recognized that the
interlocutory ruling—the pretrial denial of defendant's motion to suppress—could be
affirmed on any ground apparent from the record See id. at \ 20 n. 1 (Thorne, J.
dissenting) (citing State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 356 (Utah 1996)). Accord Bailey v.
Bayles, 2002 UT 58,ffif10 & 13, 52 P.3d 1158 (reaffirming the "well-settled" rule that an
appellate court may affirm on any ground legally and factually sustainable on the record).
But see State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ffif 9-11, 76 P.3d 1159 (refusing to remand for
additional findings to support a new theory raised by the State post-verdict). Here, the
factual findings necessary to support the alternative theory were fully found by the trial
court: defendant left her wrecked van on another's property for over five and one-half
hours, without securing the vehicle or its contents and without notifying the property
11

The Rynhart majority cited State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178, and
numerous decisions from other jurisdictions for the proposition "that Rynhart, as a vehicle
occupant, may have possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of her
vehicle." See Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, ^[ 9 n.3. The State does not contend otherwise.
See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (recognizing that passengers as well
as drivers have a reduced expectation of privacy in personal possessions transported in
vehicles).
But as recognized by the dissent, the issue here is whether "Rynhart maintained a
legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in either the van or the purse" when she left
them unsecured on another's property for over five and one-half hours following the
accident. See Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, ^ 23 (dissent) (emphasis added). Stated
differently, did defendant forfeit a reasonable expectation that the van and purse would be
protected from intrusion—whether by a passer-by or the police—when she failed to take
normal steps to secure the van and its contents before leaving the vehicle on another's
property for over five and one-half hours?
The Rynhart majority never focused on this question. Instead, it held that because
Rynhart possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy when she occupied the vehicle, that
owner or police of the damage she caused. R44-46. The trial court disagreed only on the
legal sufficiency of these facts to establish "abandonment." Id. On appeal, the State
properly re-raised its trial argument that the facts were sufficient to establish defendant's
forfeiture of a legitimate expectation of privacy. See Bailey, 2002 UT 58, \ 10; South,
924 P.2d at 356. Ultimately, the court of appeals reached the merits. See Rynhart, 2003
UT App 410, If 9 n.3 & ffi[ 24-39.
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expectation necessarily continued until the State established that she "voluntarily
relinquished" it. See Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, If 9 n.3. Citing Bissegger, 2003 UT App
256, the majority concluded that there was "no support whatsoever that Rynhart abandoned
her expectation of privacy" in her purse and that the State had failed to challenge the trial
court's "findings on abandonment" when it did not cross-appeal. SeeRynharty id. (emphasis
in original). See also discussion, n.2, supra.
Bissegger's analytical foundation is Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, which also formed the
framework for the trial court's decision. See Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256,113. See also
R45-46. In Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, ^ 15, the court of appeals concluded that
Bissegger, a vehicle passenger, did not relinquish an expectation of privacy in her lip-balm
container when she left it inside a vehicle when the police ordered her to exit. The court of
appeals adopted the "abandonment" standard approved in dicta in Rowe:
Determining whether abandonment occurred is 'primarily a factual question
of intent to voluntarily relinquish a reasonable expectation of privacy.' Rowe,
806 P.2d at 736. Thus, the abandonment determination involves two inquiries:
(1) whether the individual relinquished a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the item; and (2) whether the relinquishment was voluntary. See id. 'The
burden of proving abandonment falls on the state,. . . and must be shown by
clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence.' Id.
Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, Tj 14. As the Rynhart dissent recognized, the Bissegger-Rowe
standard conflicts with established Fourth Amendment analysis.3 See Rynhart, 2003 UT

3

Rowe was overturned by this Court on other grounds, rendering its discussion of
expectation of privacy non-controlling. In Bissegger, the court of appeals formally
adopted the Rowe dicta. This Court has not previously addressed the issue.
13

App410,f24n.4.
Though the Fourth Amendment is only marginally concerned with property concepts,
see discussion, supra, the Bissegger-Rowe standard impermissibly incorporates property
terms and standards. "Abandonment" is used in its property sense, that is, to voluntarily
relinquish ownership. See Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, ^ 14; Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736.
Similarly, the Bissegger-Rowe requirement that relinquishment be proven by "clear,
unequivocal and decisive evidence" is a civil standard imposed to determine when lawful
ownership has been permanently forsaken. See Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95, 9899 (Utah App. 1988); Linscomb v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 199 F.2d 431, 435 (8th Cir.
1952) (cited in Friedman v. United States\ 347 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 382
U.S. 946 (1965), which case was cited in Rowe, 806 P.2d at 730). Moreover, a "clear and
unequivocal" standard of proof conflicts with the preponderance of the evidence standard
normally applied to suppression issues. See, e.g.y Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168
(1986) (holding that the prosecution has no greater burden than a preponderance to establish
a waiver of "Miranda" rights); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974)
(recognizing that "the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no
greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence"); State v. Hansen, 2002 UT
125, *| 56,63 P.3d 650 (imposing a preponderance standard in determining the voluntariness
of a consent to search); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (imposing a
preponderance standard in determining if common authority exists to support a consent to
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search and recognizing that in any suppression hearing, there is "no greater burden than proof
by a preponderance of the evidence"); State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1985)
(recognizing that in any suppression hearing, the preponderance standard applies).4
Nevertheless, the trial court and the Rynhart majority fully embraced the BisseggerRowe standard. See R45-46; Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410 f 9 n.3. The standard led both
courts to erroneously conclude that defendant necessarily retained her expectation of privacy
in her van and purse unless the State established clearly and unequivocally that she
intentionally and voluntarily relinquished any interest she had in her vehicle and purse when
she left the accident scene. As will be discussed below, the Fourth Amendment does not
require such proof.
(C) The Rynhart majority erroneously focused on defendant'sfuture intent,
rather than the objective reasonableness of her actions and conduct at the
time of the search.
Whether an expectation of privacy exists is a "question of intent." SeeLaFave at 550.
Here, the Rynhart majority concluded that there was "no support whatsoever that Rynhart
abandoned her expectation of privacy in her purse . . . or wallet." Rynhart, 2003 UT App
410,19 n.3. The majority appears to have reached this conclusion because no evidence was
presented of defendant's actual subjective intent. The Fourth Amendment, however, does

4

Two of the cases cited in Rowe in support of a "clear and unequivocal" standard
pre-date Rakas. See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736 (citing Friedman, 347 F.2d 697 and United
States v. Boswell, 347 A.2d 279 (D.C. 1975)). These cases have been modified postRakas. See n.5, infra. The third case cited, O'Shaughnessey v. State, 420 So.2d 377
(Fla. App. 1982), was reaffirmed in State v. K.W., 832 So.2d 803, 805 (Fla. App. 2002).
15

not require the State to present evidence of a defendant's internal thoughts—indeed, it would
rarely be possible to do so.

Instead, "[t]he test is an objective one, and intent may be

inferred from words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts." United States v. Thomas,
864 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (cited with approval in Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736).
The majority's confusion undoubtedly arises from Rowe, as adopted in Bissegger.
Rowe initially cited Thomas and other authority for the correct proposition that the "question
of intent" is an objective determination. See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736. In its next paragraph,
however, Rowe cited Narian v. State, 556 A.2d 1158, 1161 n.4 (Md. App. 1989), cert
denied, 562 A.2d 718 (Md. 1989), for the contradictory proposition that intent is judged from
the "vantage point of the defendant and not the police." See id. Even the Maryland court
recognized that their discussion of intent was only dicta. SeeNarian, 556 A.2d at 1161 n.4.
See also 20 Maryland Law Encyclopedia, Searches and Seizures § 14 (2004) (recognizing
that Maryland law dictates that even though intent is subjective, it "is determined from the
objective facts at hand"). The other authority cited in Rowe has also been modified in light
ofRakas" s clear pronouncement that only a subj ective intent which is obj ectively reasonable
can invoke constitutional protection.5 See discussion, supra.
5

Rowe cited Friedman mdBoswell. See n.4, supra. Fost-Rakas, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia noted that Boswell was wrong in concluding that a
defendant's subjective intent controlled. See Godfrey v. United States, 408 A.2d 1244,
1246-47 & n.l (D.C. Cir. 1979). Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
recognized: "Whether an abandonment has occurred is determined on the basis of the
objective facts available to the investigating officers, not on the basis of the owner's
subjective intent." United States v. Tugwell, 125 F.3d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1061(1998).
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The Rynhart dissent correctly recognized that a defendant's subjective intent is only
a factor to be considered in determining the totality of the circumstances. Indeed, many
courts presume that a defendant may harbor a subjective hope that her property, though left
in a public place, will be free from intrusion. See, e.g., Ramapuram, 632 F.2d at 1155
(presuming that the defendant had a subjective expectation that dynamite hidden in the truck
of a "junker" would not be discovered, but holding that such a belief was objectively
unreasonable where the unlocked vehicle was located in an open field). Moreover, whether
a defendant harbors an intent to reclaim the property in the future is not controlling, though
this subjective intent, if reasonable, may be considered. See United States v. Barlow, 17
F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir.) (recognizing that a property owner need not intend to permanently
relinquish ownership or possession to forfeit a reasonable expectation of privacy; she only
needs to leave an item unsecured in a public place), cert denied, 513 U.S. 850 (1994);
United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that if the facts known
at the time of the search obj ectively establish no legitimate privacy expectation, a defendant's
subsequent conduct cannot "revoke the abandonment nunc pro tunc").
Ultimately, the test is whether the external manifestations of defendant's intent, that
is, her voluntary words, actions, or conduct, would lead a reasonable person in the searching
officer's position to believe that the defendant had forfeited any legitimate privacy interest
in the object or place to be searched. See United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449,456 (7th Cir.),
cert, denied, 124 S. Ct. 128 (2003); Tugwell, 125 F.3d at 602; United States v. Perkins, 871
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F. Supp. 801, 803 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (all recognizing that whether an expectation of privacy
exists must be judged by what a reasonable person in the officer's position would have
believed based on the facts known at the time of the search). Such a standard is no more that
the "other side of the coin" of Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy analysis. See
People v. Contreras, 210 Cal.App.3d 450,259 Cal.Rptr. 290 (Cal. App. 1989) (recognizing
that "standing" and "abandonment" are "two sides of the same coin;" whereas a defendant
must establish an expectation of privacy, the prosecution must establish the forfeiture of that
expectation) (cited with approval in Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736).
As will be discussed below, here, the officer's presumption that he, like any other
passer-by, could enter the vehicle and look inside the purse was reasonable based on the
totality of the circumstances at the time of the search.
(D) Under proper analysis, the evidence establishes that defendant forfeited
any reasonable expectation of privacy in her van and purse when she left it
unlocked and in open view on another ys propertyfor over five and one-half
hours.
Under proper Fourth Amendment analysis, the issue to be resolved is whether,
following the accident, defendant's actions and conduct forfeited any reasonable expectation
of privacy in the van and purse. See discussion, supra.
The facts are undisputed. See Statement of Facts & Add. B (Ruling). Defendant
owned the minivan and purse. At the time of the accident, she had a legitimate expectation
of privacy that both would be free from warrantless search.
The single-car accident was serious: defendant drove off the road, over a curb, down
18

an embankment and through two field fences, landing in a swampy marsh in the middle of
a privately-owned field. Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-32 (Add C), she was obligated
to locate and notify the property owner of the damage she had caused or "attach securely in
a conspicuous place on the vehicle," a note with her name and address. She did neither.
Instead, she left a briefcase on the front seat, her purse on the van's floor, and a partially
consumed vodka bottle in the console area between the two front seats. She did not lock the
doors to the vehicle or otherwise attempt to secure it. She left the accident scene. For five
and one-half hours, until the officer arrived, any passer-by could fully access the interior of
the vehicle, the purse, and the briefcase. See Statement of Facts at 4-5. See also United
States v. Austin, 66F .3d 1115, 1118-19 (10th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that a defendant must
take "normal precautions" to safeguard her privacy, or assume the risk that intrusion,
including governmental intrusion, may occur), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1084 (1996); United
States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1571 (10th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that a legitimate
expectation of privacy may not depend "entirely upon fate and the absence of inquisitive (and
acquisitive) passers-by"), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1102 (1992).
When the officer arrived, he searched the vehicle, but only to extent that any passer-by
could have—the officer simply opened the vehicle's unlocked door and looked inside the
purse and briefcase which were in plain view. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 (holding that
property readily accessible to "animals, children, scavengers, snoops and other members of
the public," is not protected from governmental search). The property owner arrived and
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wanted the van removed from his property so he could repair the damage to his fences. The
vehicle was towed. Four and one-half hours after it had been towed, some eleven hours after
the accident occurred, defendant attempted to retrieve her property from the wrecking
company. See Statement of Facts at 5-6.
Given the totality of the circumstances, defendant forfeited any reasonable expectation
of privacy in the van and purse when she left the accident scene without securing her
property and without providing notification as statutorily required. Accord Barlow, 17 F.3d
at 88-90 (holding that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in his vehicle, when he
left it unlocked with the key in the ignition on a public street at night); Oswald, 783 F.2d at
665-67 (holding that the defendant forfeited a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
suitcase when he left it in his burning car on the side of the road); State v. Brunson, 111 P.2d
938, 389 (Kan. App. 1989) (holding that the defendant forfeited any reasonable expectation
of privacy in his vehicle when he left it on a golf course, with its lights on, and the keys in
the ignition); State v. Anderson, 548 N.W.2d 40, 42 (S.D. 1996) (holding that defendant
forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy when, following an accident, he left his
vehicle with the doors unlocked and the keys in the ignition)
The trial court accepted these facts, but came to a different conclusion as to their
significance. Based on Rowe, the trial court opined that it needed to know if the van was
drivable. If it was, the court believed it would be reasonable to assume that it was
"abandoned"; if not, the court presumed that defendant did not have enough time to arrange
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for its recovery. R46.

It was these "findings" that the court of appeals viewed as

unchallenged and, therefore, binding on the State on appeal. See Rynhart, 2003 UT App
410, \ 9 n.3. The trial court's statements, however, were not factual; they simply reflected
the judge's opinion of the sufficiency of the facts. Moreover, in this case, the mobility of the
vehicle is irrelevant to the privacy issue. Whatever the mobility of the minivan, it was in the
middle of a marsh. Moreover, defendant failed to lock the vehicle or otherwise protect its
contents when she left it, knowing that any passer-by, including the police, might investigate
the obvious accident. See Houghton, 562 U.S. at 303 (recognizing that when a vehicle is in
an accident, it is reasonable to assume that its contents may be exposed to public scrutiny);
Cormney v. Commonwealth, 943 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. App. 1996) (recognizing that a
subjective expectation of privacy necessarily yields to the public safety interest of police
investigating traffic accidents); Muegel v. State, 272 N.E.2d 617, 620 (Ind. 1971)
(recognizing that when an unlocked vehicle is left unattended on the road, it is reasonable
for an officer to enter it to search for the vehicle's registration); Brunson, 111 P.2d at 395
(recognizing that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen the possibility of a police
search when he left his vehicle unlocked on a golf course); State v. Lemacks, 268 S.E.2d 285
(S.C. 1980) (recognizing that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that the police
would investigate and possibly tow his unlocked vehicle when it was parked in a hazardous
manner).
Based on the totality of the circumstances, defendant had no reasonable expectation
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of privacy in her vehicle or purse at the time Officer Burnham searched them.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the court of appeals and affirm
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. The matter should then be
remanded to the district court to proceed to trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this gMday of November, 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah AttorneYx-General
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Background
Defendant was charged with
possession of controlled substance within 1000 feet
of public structure and possession of drug
paraphernalia The First District Court, Brigham
City Department, Ben H Hadfield, J , denied
defendant's motion to suppress
Holdmg On defendant's petition for interlocutory
appeal, the Court of Appeals, James Z Davis, J ,
held that emergency aid doctrme did not apply to
justify warrantless search of defendant's vehicle
Reversed
William A Thorne Jr , J , filed
concurrmg in part and dissentmg m part
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West Headnotes
[1] Searches and Seizures <@^>28
349k28
Defendant did not relinquish expectation of privacy
in vehicle or in purse and wallet left m vehicle
found by police officer investigating one-car
accident, absent any showmg that driver mtended to
abandon vehicle after accident, or that vehicle was
operable after accident U S C A Const Amend 4
[2] Automobiles <§^=>349 5(1)
48Ak349 5(1)
[2] Automobiles <®^349 5(11)
48Ak349 5(11)
Police officer did not have objectively reasonable
basis to believe that emergency existed and that
immediate need for assistance for protection of life
or that driver could have been lost, disoriented, or
injured, so as to justify warrantless search of
unoccupied vehicle involved m apparent one car
accident under emergency aid doctrine, and of purse
and wallet found within, claim that driver may have
been injured or was lost and disoriented was nothing
more than speculation as there was nothing m the

vehicle to mdicate that anyone had been injured, and
officer had no reason to believe that anything in
purse or wallet would provide any information for
the purpose of administering medical assistance
U S C A Const Amend 4
[3] Searches and Seizures <®=>24
349k24
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless
undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement U S C A Const Amend 4
[4] Searches and Seizures <®=>192 1
349kl92 1
The burden of establishing the existence of one of
the exceptions to the warrant requirement is on the
prosecution U S C A Const Amend 4
[5] Searches and Seizures <s£=>42 1
349k42 1
One exception to the warrant requirement is exigent
circumstances U S C A Const Amend 4
[6] Searches and Seizures <S^=>42 1
349k42 1
The emergency aid doctrine, sometimes referred to
as the medical emergency doctrine, is a variant of
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement U S C A Const Amend 4
[7] Searches and Seizures <®=>42 1
349k42 1
A warrantless search is lawful under the emergency
aid doctrme if (1) police have an objectively
reasonable basis to believe that an emergency exists
and believe there is an immediate need for their
assistance for the protection of life, (2) the search is
not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize
evidence, and (3) there is some reasonable basis to
associate the emergency with the area or place to be
searched, that is, there must be a connection with
the area to be searched and the emergency
U S C A Const Amend 4
[8] Searches and Seizures <®^192 1
349kl92 1
Whether an emergency exists to justify a
warrantless search is fact intensive and the State has
the burden to prove that the exigencies of the
situation make the course imperative
U SCA
Const Amend 4
[9] Searches and Seizures <@^42 1
349k42 1
There must be some reliable and specific indication
of the probability that a person is suffering from a
serious physical injury before application of the
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emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement
to the search of a vehicle is justified. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
[10] Searches and Seizures c®=?42.1
349k42.1
Under the rationale of the emergency aid doctrine,
a warrantless search is allowed if the purpose of the
search is to discover evidence of identification and
other information that might enhance the prospect of
administering appropriate medical assistance,
protecting life, or avoiding serious injury to another.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
*815 James M. Retallick, Public Defenders
Association, Ogden, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and Marian
Decker, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.
Before DAVIS, GREENWOOD, and THORNE,
JL
OPINION
DAVIS, Judge:
^| 1 Tanja Rynhart appeals from a trial court order
denying her motion to suppress evidence seized
during a warrantless search of her vehicle. We
reverse.

BACKGROUND
K 2 On the morning of January 6, 2002, Officer
Robert Burnham of the Brigham City Police
Department received a dispatch call requesting
investigation of an abandoned or wrecked vehicle.
Burnham responded to the call at approximately
8:30 a.m. Upon arriving at the location of the
vehicle, Burnham discovered that the vehicle had
"traveled over the curb, down an embankment,
[and] through two fences," before coming to rest in
a "marsh" or "swamp." Burnham also discovered
that the tire tracks leading to the vehicle were
covered with snow. Because Burnham recalled that
"[i]t had snowed as recently as 3:00" a.m., he
determined that the accident had occurred at some
point prior to that time.
T[ 3 As Burnham approached the vehicle, he saw
that it had a license plate, but he did not attempt to
identify the owner of the vehicle by using the license

plate number.
Burnham entered the unlocked
vehicle and discovered that there was no one inside.
At the May 29, 2002 preliminary hearing, Burnham
testified that his purpose for entering the vehicle was
to "[t]ry to find out the identity of the owner, the
driver, and if anybody was in the vehicle at all."
However, at the July 22, 2002 hearing *816 on the
motion to suppress, Burnham admitted that he
performed a "very thorough search" of the vehicle,
and testified that he "opened all the doors" and
"looked under the seats." He testified that there
were "quite a number of items in the vehicle," but
admitted that he did not inventory all of the
vehicle's contents. Burnham indicated that he was
"primarily concerned with" finding and retrieving
any "jewelry," "money," or "valuables" that may
have been left in the vehicle.
II 4 In his search of the vehicle, Burnham found a
partially full bottle of vodka in the console between
the two front seats, a briefcase on the front
passenger seat, and a purse on the floor near the
front passenger seat. He searched through the purse
and the briefcase to determine their contents. Inside
the purse, Burnham found a wallet, which he also
searched. In his search of the purse and the wallet,
Burnham found Rynhart's driver license, $329 in
cash, several gift certificates, a small plastic bag
containing a "white powdery substance," and "a
mirror with some powder on it."
K 5 After Burnham completed his investigation, he
had the vehicle towed to a wrecking yard for "safe
keeping," but did not officially impound the vehicle.
[FN1] He retained the briefcase, the purse, and the
items he found in the purse. At some point after he
had "cleared from the scene" of the accident,
Burnham attempted to contact Rynhart by phone,
but was unsuccessful.
Later that afternoon,
someone from the wrecking yard contacted Burnham
by phone to notify him that Rynhart was attempting
to retrieve her vehicle. Burnham went to the
wrecking yard and met with Rynhart. At that time,
Burnham asked Rynhart about the small plastic bag
containing white powder that he had found in
Rynhart's purse. Rynhart admitted to Burnham that
the small plastic bag contained cocaine, but told him
that it belonged to a friend.
FNL Burnham neither attempted to obtain a
warrant nor conduct an inventory search.
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f 6 On March 27, 2002, Rynhart was charged with
possession of a controlled substance within 1000 feet
of a public structure, a second degree felony, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor. At the conclusion of the May 29,
2002 preliminary hearing, the trial court ruled that
there were "reasonable grounds to believe that
[Rynhart] committed the offense [s]M and,
accordingly, "required] that [Rynhart] be held to
answer on the charges." Rynhart pleaded not guilty
to both charges.
H 7 Thereafter, Rynhart filed a motion to suppress
the evidence seized during Burnham's warrantless
search of her vehicle. In its ruling on Rynhart's
motion, the trial court determined that Rynhart had
not abandoned her expectation of privacy in her
vehicle. In support of this determination, the trial
court made the following findings, which are not
challenged on appeal:
The officer inspected the vehicle at 8:30 in the
morning and determined that it had been in the
marsh since at least 3:00 ... that morning. The
owner or driver would not have had time to make
arrangements to retrieve the vehicle if it was
damaged. The State failed to present any evidence
of the state of the vehicle. If the vehicle could be
driven, then the officer may have been more
justified in believing that it had been abandoned.
Although there clearly had been an accident, it
appears that no other vehicles were involved. The
apparent early hour, the winter conditions, and the
single vehicle nature of the accident all combine to
belie the officer's imputing an intent to abandon
the vehicle.
However, the trial court also determined that
Burnham's warrantless search of Rynhart's vehicle
was justified under the emergency aid doctrine.
[FN2] See Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT
App 12,H 12, 994 P.2d 1283. In support of this
determination the trial court entered the following
findings:
FN2. Although the trial court refers to this
doctrine as "the community caretaker function" in
its ruling, it applies the elements of the emergency
aid doctrine set forth in Salt Lake City v.
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,11 12, 994 P.2d 1283,
to determine whether Burnham's warrantless
search of Rynhart's vehicle was justified.
The accident occurred around 3:00 a.m. on a cold
January night. The absence of the driver made it

imperative that the officer identify the driver so
that he or she could *817 be found. The driver
could have been in distress and lost or disoriented.
The officer acted appropriately in attempting to
determine who was [sic] the driver. Although
[Rynhart] makes a good point that the owner of
the vehicle could be ascertained by using the
license plate number, the owner and the driver are
not necessarily the same person, and the officer
had a duty to ascertain the facts in order to
preserve life in the event the driver had wandered
off and was lost.
Based upon its conclusion that the emergency aid
doctrine was applicable, the trial court denied
Rynhart's motion to suppress in an order dated
September 3, 2002.
K 8 On September 23, 2002, Rynhart petitioned this
court, pursuant to rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, to permit her appeal from the
trial court's interlocutory order denying her motion
to suppress. On November 5, 2002, we granted that
petition and Rynhart's appeal ensued.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] \ 9 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial
court erred in denying Rynhart's motion to suppress
evidence. [FN3] The trial *818 court denied the
motion based upon its determination that the
warrantless search of Rynhart's vehicle was justified
under the emergency aid doctrine. See Salt Lake
City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,H 12, 994 P.2d
1283.
FN3. Although this is the sole issue raised by
Rynhart, the State suggests that we should, without
the benefit of a cross-appeal, reverse the trial
court's ruling that Rynhart had not abandoned her
expectation of privacy in her vehicle. Not only
does the record offer scant support for that
proposition, it offers no support whatsoever that
Rynhart abandoned her expectation of privacy in
her purse and the contents thereof, or her wallet
and the contents thereof. In State v. Bissegger,
2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178, we cited
numerous cases addressing the issue of a motor
vehicle occupant's expectation of privacy in
personal belongings left in the vehicle.
See, e.g., United States v. Salazar, 805 F.2d 1394,
1396 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that a car passenger
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
closed brown paper bag found on the floorboard of
his companion's car); People v. Manke, 181
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Ill.App.3d 374, 130 111.Dec. 192, 537 N.E.2d 13,
15 (1989) (concluding that a car passenger whose
closed brown paper bag was found in car's trunk,
and was searched by police, had standing to
challenge search); Arnold v. Commonwealth, 17
Va.App. 313, 437 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1993)
(holding that a car passenger had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his closed plastic
shopping bag found on the floor of the car).
Other jurisdictions have also held that car
passengers have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in their coats or jackets found in cars. See People
v. Armendarez, 188 Mich.App. 61, 468 N.W.2d
893, 900 (1991) (finding that car passenger had
"standing to object to the search of his personal
effects in the car, namely, his coat," where his coat
was found on front seat of vehicle); State v.
McCarthy, 258 Mont. 51, 852 P.2d 111, 112-13
(1993) (holding that car passenger had legitimate
expectation of privacy in his jacket found crumpled
on the back seat of car).
Finally, other jurisdictions have found that car
passengers have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in their purses left in cars. See United States v.
Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1151, 1154 (5th Cir.1993)
(holding that the owner of a shoulder bag, located
on the front seat of his girlfriend's car, had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag and its
contents); United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761,
764 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that car passenger who
left her purse in her boyfriend's car "had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
her purse. Indeed, a purse is a type of container in
which a person possesses the highest expectations
of privacy."); State v. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d 1231,
1235-37 (IndCt.App.1999) (holding that car
passenger whose purse was found on floor behind
driver's seat and searched had standing because "a
purse is clearly a container in which a person has a
legitimate expectation of privacy").
Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256 at ffl 9-11, 76 P.3d
178.
In his dissent, our colleague admits that these cases
clearly support the proposition that vehicle
occupants may possess a legitimate expectation of
privacy in their personal belongings left in a
vehicle. However, he asserts that we have
"mistakenly" focused our attention on these cases
and the proposition they stand for in reaching our
conclusion that Rynhart did not abandon her
expectation of privacy in her vehicle or its
contents. He misapprehends our reliance upon
these cases and the proposition they stand for. We
do not rely upon these cases as the sole support for
our ultimate conclusion on abandonment; rather,
we rely upon these cases for the proposition that
our colleague admits they stand for~that Rynhart,

as a vehicle occupant, may have possessed a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of
her vehicle.
We then determine that (1) Rynhart clearly had "a
subjective expectation of privacy" not just in her
vehicle, but also in its contents; and (2) as the trial
court's unchallenged findings on abandonment
establish, that this "expectation was objectively
reasonable."' Id. at If 7 (quotations and citation
omitted).
Accordingly, Rynhart did have a
legitimate expectation of privacy both in her
vehicle and in its contents. See id.
Finally, again based upon the trial court's
unchallenged findings on abandonment, we
conclude that Rynhart never "voluntarily
relinquished] a reasonable expectation of privacy"
and, accordingly, that she did not abandon her
expectation of privacy in her vehicle or in its
contents. Id. at Tf 14 (quotations and citation
omitted). In an era when our citizens' expectations
of privacy are not only being eroded, but
affirmatively attacked, we, too, are puzzled by the
herculean effort of our esteemed colleague to
obtain a result that not only is unsupported by the
authorities he relies upon, unsupported by the
facts, and contrary to the express ruling of the trial
court, but also further erodes what is left of
legitimate expectations of privacy.
The factual findings underlying a trial court's
decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
evidence are reviewed under the deferential
clearly-erroneous standard, and the legal
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's
application of the legal standard to the facts.
State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996).
ANALYSIS
[2] K 10 Rynhart argues that the trial court erred in
denying her motion to suppress evidence. The trial
court denied the motion based upon its
determination that the warrantless search of
Rynhart's vehicle was justified under the emergency
aid doctrine. See Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000
UT App 12,H 12, 994 P.2d 1283.
[3][4] [5] [6] 1f 11 "The Fourth Amendment prohibits
all unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken
pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855
(Utah 1992) (citation omitted). "The burden of
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establishing the existence of one of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement is on the prosecution."
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990);
see State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah
1995). "One such exception to the warrant
requirement recognized by both the United States
Supreme Court and Utah's appellate courts is
exigent circumstances. The emergency aid doctrine,
sometimes referred to as the medical emergency
doctrine, is a variant of the exigent circumstances
doctrine." Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 at ffi[ 9-10,
994 P.2d 1283 (citations omitted).
[7] [8] K 12 In Davidson, we explained that
"[tjhe [emergency aid doctrine] will support a
warrantless search of a person or personal effects
when [a] person is found in an unconscious or
semiconscious condition and the purpose of the
search is to discover evidence of identification and
other information that might enhance the prospect
of administering appropriate medical assistance,
and the rationale is that the need to protect life or
avoid serious injury to another is paramount to the
rights of privacy...." Several courts have also
applied the emergency aid doctrine when a person
is missing and feared to be injured or dead.
Id. (third and fourth alterations in original)
(quoting Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Lawfulness
of Search of Person or Personal Effects Under
Medical
Emergency Exception
to Warrant
Requirement, 11 A.L.R. 5th 52, § 2[a] (1993)). We
adopted the emergency aid doctrine in Davidson, see
id. at % 13, and provided the following test for its
application:
[A] warrantless search is lawful under the
emergency aid doctrine if the following
requirements are met:
(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to
believe that an emergency exists and believe there
is an immediate need for their assistance for the
protection of life.
(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent
to arrest and seize evidence.
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the
emergency with the area or place to be searched.
That is, there must be a connection with the area
to be searched and the emergency.
Id. at If 12 (quotations and citation omitted).
Under this test, "[w]hether an emergency exists is
fact intensive and the [S]tate has the *819 burden to
prove that the exigencies of the situation make the
course imperative." Id. at ^f 10 (quotations and

citation omitted). "This court has observed that
application of the emergency aid doctrine should be
strictly circumscribed ... because of the significant
departure [it] takes from Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence by requiring neither a warrant nor
probable cause as prerequisites to a search." State
v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219,f 17, 51 P.3d 55
(quotations and citations omitted), cert, denied, 59
P.3d 603 (Utah 2002).
U 13 To satisfy the first prong of the emergency aid
doctrine, the State must show that Burnham had "an
objectively reasonable basis to believe that an
emergency exist[ed]M and that he believed there was
"an immediate need for [his] assistance for the
protection of life." Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 a t f
12, 994 P.2d 1283 (quotations and citation omitted).
Our review of the record and the trial court's ruling
reveals that several of the trial court's findings
relating to the first prong are clearly erroneous.
K 14 The trial court determined that the first prong
was satisfied based upon several findings. The trial
court's findings that "[t]he accident occurred around
3:00 a.m. on a cold January night," and that the
driver was "absen[t]" are supported by evidence in
the record. Although these findings certainly weigh
in favor of satisfying the first prong, in this case
they are not sufficient, without more, to satisfy the
first prong. The trial court's other findings that
"[t]he driver could have been in distress and lost or
disoriented" and that "the officer had a duty ... to
preserve life in the event the driver had wandered
off and was lost" are speculative and unsupported by
evidence in the record. There is no evidence in the
record indicating that facts gathered by Burnham at
the scene of the accident were objectively indicative
of injury to possible victims of the accident which
would require him to "preserve life," or of any
passengers
of
the
vehicle being
"lost,"
"disoriented," or "in distress." [FN4] Accordingly,
we conclude that these unsupported findings are
clearly erroneous.
FN4. Indeed, the accident occurred on a major
street within 1000 feet of a public structure.
f 15 Because the aforesaid findings are clearly
erroneous, we conclude that the trial court erred in
determining that the first prong of the emergency aid
doctrine was satisfied. Consequently, the trial court
erred in concluding that the emergency aid doctrine
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was applicable in this case.
[9] [10] ^
16 Moreover,
when
"strictly
circumscribed," the emergency aid doctrine, as a
whole, does not apply to the facts of this case.
Comer, 2002 UT App 219 at If 17, 51 P.3d 55
(quotations and citations omitted). First, because
Burnham did not find anyone in the vehicle in an
"unconscious or semiconscious condition," the
doctrine would be applicable only if "a person [was]
missing and feared to be injured or dead."
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 at \ 10, 994 P.2d 1283
(quotations and citations omitted). In that situation,
"there must be some reliable and specific indication
of the probability that a person is suffering from a
serious physical injury before application of the
[emergency aid] doctrine is justified." Comer, 2002
UT App 219 at \ 20, 51 P.3d 55. There is no
evidence in the record indicating that Burnham ever
observed anything at the scene of the accident that
was a "reliable and specific indication of the
probability that a person [was] suffering from a
serious physical injury."
Id. Without these
indications, not only was Burnham not justified in
searching the purse or wallet under the emergency
aid doctrine, he had no reason to believe that
anything that may be found in the purse or wallet
would provide these indications, or that the owner
of the purse or wallet was even in the vehicle when
it left the roadway. Second, under the rationale of
the emergency aid doctrine, a warrantless search is
allowed if "the purpose of the search is to discover
evidence of identification and other information that
might enhance the prospect of administering
appropriate medical assistance, ... protecting] life[,]
or avoid [ing] serious injury to another." Davidson,
2000 UT App 12 at \ 10, 994 P.2d 1283 (quotations
and citation omitted).
Although Burnham did
discover Rynhart's driver license during his
warrantless search of her purse and wallet, there is
no evidence in the record indicating *820 that he
searched these items for this purpose. Other than
his phone calls to Rynhart, there is no evidence in
the record suggesting that he took any action after
completing his search of these items that could be
construed as an attempt to provide "appropriate
medical assistance, ... protect life[,] or avoid serious
injury to another." Id. (quotations and citation
omitted). Consequently, the trial court's application
of the emergency aid doctrine, as a whole, to the
facts of this case was improper.
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K 17 Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that
the trial court erred in determining that the
emergency aid doctrine was applicable in this case.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in
denying Rynhart's motion to suppress evidence
seized during the warrantless search of her vehicle.
CONCLUSION
Tf 18 We conclude that several of the trial court's
findings relating to the first prong of the emergency
aid doctrine are clearly erroneous. Because these
findings are clearly erroneous, we conclude that the
trial court erred in determining that the first prong
was satisfied and that the emergency aid doctrine
was applicable in this case. Moreover, we conclude
that the emergency aid doctrine, as a whole, is
inapplicable to the facts of this case. Therefore, we
conclude that the trial court erred in denying
Rynhart's motion to suppress evidence seized during
the warrantless search of her vehicle.
H 19 I CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,
Tudge.
THORNE, Judge (concurring and dissenting):
% 20 I concur with the majority's conclusion that
the trial court erred in admitting the evidence under
the emergency aid doctrine. However, we part
ways when the majority concludes that Rynhart
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the van and its contents when, following a single car
accident, she left it, unsecured and parked on
property not owned by Rynhart. [FN1] My reasons
for dissenting are threefold: (1) The majority, in
summarily deciding that Rynhart did not abandon
her expectation of privacy, relies on a series of
cases that have little or nothing to do with the issue
of abandonment; (2) the abandonment standard
relied upon by the majority is actually a standard
applicable to property law and it flies in the face of
widely accepted abandonment analysis for Fourth
Amendment purposes; and (3) even under the
existing Utah standard, Rynhart abandoned her
subjective expectation of privacy.
FN1. The majority points out the fact that the
State failed to file a cross appeal on the issue of
abandonment. However, the State was under no
duty to do so. We are permitted to affirm the trial
court's order-in this case the denial of the motion
to suppress-on any grounds apparent from the
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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record, even if the trial court addressed the ground
we rely upon in a subsidiary ruling. See State v.
South, 924 P.2d 354, 356 (Utah 1996). Thus, if
we are able to conclude from the record before us
that Rynhart abandoned her reasonable expectation
of privacy in the van, we can affirm the trial
court's denial of Rynhart's motion to suppress on
these grounds. See id. at 357.
f 21 The majority, in drawing its conclusion, relies
on a series of cases found in State v. Bissegger,
2003 UT App 256,UH 13-15, 76 P.3d 178. However,
not only did the Bissegger court cite these cases for
a different proposition altogether, see id. atffi[9-11,
none of the cited cases addresses the abandonment
of a legitimate expectation of privacy. See United
States v. Buchner, 1 F.3d 1149, 1154-55 (5th
Cir.1993) (addressing the scope of third party
consent and probable cause to search); United
States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 765 (9th Cir.1993)
(addressing the scope and effect of third party
consent to search); United States v. Salazar, 805
F.2d 1394, 1396-98 (9th Cir.1986) (addressing a car
passenger's standing to object to a search and the
scope of the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement), overruled by
implication by United States v. Lopez-Angulo, 1992
LEXIS 26380, *2 (9th Cir. October 8, 1992); State
v. Manke,% 181 Dl.App.3d 374, 130 Ill.Dec. 192,
537 N.E.2d 13, 15 (1989) (addressing a passenger's
standing to object to an automobile search, as well
as the voluntariness of the driver's consent to a
search); State v. Friedel, *821 714 N.E.2d 1231,
1240 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999) (addressing the scope and
effect of a car owner's consent to search an
automobile on a passenger's property contained
within the car); [FN2] State v. Armendarez, 188
Mich.App. 61, 468 N.W.2d 893, 900-01 (1991)
(examining a passenger's standing to object to a
search of his personal belongings found in the car
and concluding that the passenger's belongings were
subject to search pursuant to the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement); State v. McCarthy, 258 Mont. 51, 852
P.2d 111, 113-14 (1993) (addressing the scope of
the automobile exception and its applicability to
containers and other objects found within the car to
be searched); Arnold v. Virginia, 17 Va.App. 313,
437 S.E.2d 235, 238 (1993) (addressing a person's
standing to object to searches of their own property,
but disposing of the argument under the plain view
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement).

FN2. State v. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d 1231
(Ind.Ct.App.1999), briefly mentions, then
summarily disposes of, the doctrine of
abandonment, without venturing into any
substantive analysis of the issue, presumably due to
its inapplicability in the case. See id. at 1241.
U 22 In relying on these cases, the majority
mistakenly focuses its attention on the existence of a
passenger's legitimate expectation of privacy in
personal belongings located in a vehicle. From the
aforementioned cases, clearly cited in Bissegger,
there is no question that passengers in automobiles
may possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in
their own belongings located in a vehicle. See also
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119
S.Ct. 1297, 1302, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999)
("Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a
reduced expectation of privacy with regard to
property that they transport in cars, which 'trave[l]
public thoroughfares.' ") (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
H 23 However, these cases do not support the
conclusion that Rynhart maintained a legitimate or
reasonable expectation of privacy in either the van
or the purse. [FN3]
FN3. I am also puzzled by the majority's focus on
the purse. While, admittedly, the critical evidence
was discovered in the purse, had this situation
involved only the purse, and not the van, there is
little question that the officer's conduct would be
considered eminently reasonable. The officer
would have reasonably concluded that the purse, or
at least the owner's reasonable expectation of
privacy, had been abandoned. Thus, the critical
question is whether Rynhart had or retained a
legitimate privacy interest in the van, and, through
the van, in its contents.
See Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 306-07, 119 S.Ct. 1297,
1303-04, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (acknowledging
that containers in a vehicle are to be treated as a
part of the vehicle for purposes of Fourth
Amendment analysis).
% 24 Instead, our analysis should follow either
United States v. Barlow, 17 F.3d 85 (5th Cir. 1994),
or United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663 (6th
Cir.1986), in addressing this issue. [FN4]
In
Barlow, following a robbery, *823 a police officer
followed the robber's escape path. See Barlow, 17
F.3d at 87. Along this path, the officer discovered
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"a car parked at the end of a street, away from any
businesses and pointed toward the freeway." Id. The
officer approached the car and found that it was
unlocked, that the engine was warm, and that a key
was in the ignition. See id. The officer then
reported the car's license plate number and was
informed that the listed owner claimed "no longer to
own the car." Id. The officer then looked in the car
in an attempt to identify the current owner. See id.
He opened the glove compartment and found a
wallet, Barlow's identification, and some .38 caliber
bullets. See id. Soon thereafter, the officer caught
up to Barlow, arrested him, and, during a search
incident to the arrest, discovered a loaded .38
caliber pistol. See id. Barlow moved to suppress
the evidence discovered during the officer's search
of the car, which the trial court denied. See id.
FN4. The Bissegger court, in addressing the
State's abandonment argument, relied upon State v.
Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct.App.1991), rev'd,
850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992) (reversing our
conclusion that the warrant was invalid, thus, the
supreme court had no reason to address the
abandonment issue). See State v. Bissegger, 2003
UT App 256,1fll 13-15, 76 P.3d 178. However,
while the Bissegger court noted that Rowe had-been
reversed, it failed to acknowledge that the Rowe
decision is at best a plurality. See Rowe, 806 P.2d
at 739 (Garff, J., concurring); 806 P.2d at 740
(Jackson, J., dissenting). Thus, the precedential
value of Rowe is limited. Moreover, I believe that
our particular abandonment standard, based on the
Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, is fatally flawed. Through this
standard, we have placed the burden on the state to
show by clear, unequivocal, and decisive evidence,
that the defendant actually intended to abandon his
or her legitimate right to privacy. See Bissegger,
2003 UT App 256 at t 14, 76 P.3d 178. There are
two problems with this standard.
First, the expectation that the state must,
essentially, prove abandonment by clear and
convincing evidence, see Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736
(stating that "[t]he burden of proving abandonment
falls on the state, and must be shown by 'clear,
unequivocal and decisive evidence' " (citation
omitted)), does not comport with the expectations
of most other courts. See United States v. Pitts,
322 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir.2003) ("To
demonstrate abandonment, the government must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant's ... actions would lead a reasonable
person in the searching officer's position to believe
that the defendant relinquished his property
interests in the item to be searched."), cert, denied,

— U.S. — , 124 S.Ct. 128, 157 L.Ed.2d 90
(2003); United States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 829,
836
(7th
Cir.2000)
("To
demonstrate
abandonment, the government must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's
voluntary words or conduct would lead a
reasonable person in the searching officer's
position to believe that the defendant relinquished
his property interests in the item searched or
seized.").
Moreover, the "clear, unequivocal and decisive
evidence" standard adopted in Rowe is actually the
standard of evidence applied in civil cases dealing
with the abandonment of a property right, not the
abandonment of a legitimate expectation of
privacy, see Friedman v. United States, 341 F.2d
697, 704-06 (8th Cir.1965) (addressing the
question of whether the defendants in the case had
abandoned their property rights to certain premises
or its contents), and it seems to have been unwisely
imported into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Accord State v. Finney, No. 21180, 2003 WL
245727, *5, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 518, *14
(Ohio Ct.App. February 5, 2003) (" 'The issue is
not abandonment in the strict property-right sense,
but whether the person prejudiced by the search
had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise
relinquished his interest in the property in question
so that he could no longer retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time
of the search.' " (citation omitted)); State v.
Villegas, No. 21100-2-IH, 116 Wash.App. 1014,
2003 WL 1091032, *2 2003 Wash.App. LEXIS
416, *6 (Wash.Ct.App. March 13, 2003) (stating
"the crux of our analysis is not [the defendant's]
interest [in the container] as applied under property
law, but his reasonable expectation of privacy in
the [container] under a potential illegal search
analysis."), amended by No. 21100-2-III, 2003
Wash.App. LEXIS 1097 (June 3, 2003); see
Linscomb v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 199
F.2d 431, 433 (8th Cir.1952) (abandonment as an
affirmative defense in replevin action); Williams v.
Barnette, No. CA98-1261, 1999 WL 360291,
**l-5 1999 Ark.App. LEXIS 409, **l-4
(Ark.Ct.App. June 2, 1999) (abandonment and
easements); Stone v. Geyser Quicksilver Mining
Co., 52 Cal. 315, 317- 18 (1877) (abandonment
and mining rights); Mineral Mgmt. Group, Inc. v.
Chandler, NO.2002-CA-001178-MR, 2003 WL
21246036, **l-3 2003 Ky.App. LEXIS 135, **l-3
(Ky.Ct.App. May 30, 2003) (abandonment and
natural gas leases); Phillips v. Gregg, 628 A.2d
151, 152-53 (Me. 1993) (abandonment and
easements); Doherty v. Russell, 116 Me. 269, 101
A. 305, 306-07 (1917) (abandonment and life
estates); Stieffv. Collins, 237 Md. 601, 207 A.2d
489,
490-91
(1965)
(abandonment
of
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nonconforming use),
Clausi v Meddaugh, 116 A D 2d 850, 498
N Y S 2d
267,
268
(N Y App Div 1986)
(abandonment and easements), Consolidated Rail
Corp v MASP Equip Corp , 67 N Y 2d 35, 499
N Y S 2d 647, 490 N E 2d 514 1986 N Y LEXIS
16334, **4-6 (NY
February 11, 1986)
(abandonment and easements),
New Yoik
Connecting R Co v Queens Used Auto Parts,
Inc, 72 N Y S 2d 546, 549-50 (N Y Sup 1947)
(abandonment and easements), modified, 273 A D
908, 77 N Y S 2d 505 (N Y App Div 1948),
Moore v DeVault, No M2001-02225-COAR3-CV, 2002 WL 31769110, **l-3 2002
TennApp LEXIS 864, **8-10 (Term Ct App
December
11, 2002)
(abandonment
and
easements), Second Chance Farms, Inc v Perry
County, No M200-00513- COA-R3-CV, 2001
WL 219642, **5-6 2001 TennApp LEXIS 145,
**11-15
(TennCtApp
March 7,
2001)
(abandonment and public roads), Lipscomb v
Commins, 212 Va 543, 186 S E 2d 74, 74-75
(1972) (per curiam) (abandonment and rights of
way), see also Simms v District of Columbia, 612
A 2d 215, 218-19 (D C 1992) (abandonment of
property as an affirmative defense), Williams v
United States, 337 A 2d 772, 774 (D C 1975)
(same)
Second, our requirement that the state prove the
defendant's intent, m other words the adoption of a
subjective standard of proof, also fails to comport
with most other courts' analyses of this issue See,
e g , United States v Lonedog, 67 Fed Appx 543,
2003 WL 21357264 2003 U S App LEXIS 11687
(10th Cir 2003) ('The abandonment determination
is made by objective standards
However, an
expectation of privacy is a question of intent which
may be inferred from words spoken, acts done,
and other objective facts "), Pitts, 322 F 3d at
456, ("[Abandonment] is an objective test[ ]"),
Basinski, 226 F 3d at 836 ("Because this is an
objective test, it does not matter whether the
defendant harbors a desire to later reclaim an item,
we look solely to the external manifestations of his
intent as judged by a reasonable person possessing
the same knowledge available to the government
agents "), United States v Yiu Pong Liu, 180
F 3d 957, 960 (8th Cir 1999) (" '[W]hether an
abandonment has occurred is determined on the
basis of objective facts available to the
investigating officers, not on the basis of the
owner's subjective intent' " (citation omitted)),
United States v Jones, 707 F 2d 1169, 1172 (10th
Cir 1983) ('The test for abandonment is whether
an individual has retained any reasonable
expectation of privacy in the object
This
determination is to be made by objective
standards " (citation omitted)), United States v

Gutierrez-Medina, 41 F Supp 2d 1191, 1195
(E D Wash 1998) ( T h e test [for abandonment of a
legitimate expectation of privacy] is an objective
one and intent may be inferred from words spoken,
acts done and other objective acts " (emphasis
added)), State v Dixon, 2001 WL 209907, *4
2001 Del Super LEXIS 66, *15 (Del Super Ct
February 15, 2001) ("When determining whether
property has been abandoned in the context of
search and seizure analysis, the Court must
administer an objective test "), State v K W, 832
So 2d 803, 805 (Fla Ct App 2002) (per curiam)
(Nesbitt, J , concurring) ("The test to be applied m
determining whether a person has abandoned
property is an objective one[]"),
State v
Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 981 P 2d 1160, 1162
(Idaho Ct App 1999) ("Abandonment, in the
Fourth Amendment context, occurs through words,
acts, or other objective facts indicating that the
defendant voluntarily discarded, left behind, or
otherwise relinquished his interest in property "),
State v Villegas, 116 Wash App 1014, 2003 WL
1091032, *2 2003 Wash App LEXIS 416, *6
(Wash Ct App March 13, 2003) ("Abandonment
is an ultimate fact or conclusion based generally
upon a combination of act and intent
[I]ntent
may be inferred from words spoken, acts done,
and other objective facts with all relevant
circumstances
surrounding
the
alleged
abandonment considered " (second alteration m
original) (quotations and citations omitted))
Finally, I believe the holding of Rowe conflicts~if
not m fact, at least m spint~with California v
Hodari, 499 U S 621, 111 S Ct 1547, 113
L Ed 2d 690 (1991), which was decided after we
issued Rowe In Hodari, the Supreme Court
addressed whether the defendant had an
expectation of privacy m evidence picked-up by the
police after the defendant had tossed it away See
id at 623-24, 111 S Ct at 1549 Although the
opinion focused on whether the defendant had been
unlawfully seized prior to discarding the evidence,
the Court, relying on Hester v United States, 265
U S 57, 58, 44 S Ct 445, 446, 68 L Ed 898
(1924), concluded that the evidence had been
abandoned by the defendant, even though he was
being pursued by the police
See Hodan, 499
U S at 629, 111 S Ct at 1552
In Rowe, during a search incident to a warrant,
police officers informed the defendant that she was
free to leave and escorted her to a bedroom to
retrieve her belongings See State v Rowe, 806
P2d 730, 736 (Utah Ct App 1991), rev'd, 850
P 2d 427 (Utah 1992) After she retrieved her
shoes, she affirmatively claimed that she owned
nothing else m the room See id (' Defendant was
allowed to leave the party
She was conducted to
the bedroom to retrieve her shoes and was given
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the opportunity to claim any other property that
belonged to her. When asked ... she stated that
she had retrieved everything in the bedroom that
was hers."). Later, police officers discovered
defendant's purse, in which they found
methamphetamine as well as defendant's
identification. See id. at 732. Defendant was
subsequently arrested, and eventually filed a
motion to suppress the evidence. See id. On
appeal, this court, after first determining that the
warrant was flawed (a determination later reversed
by the Utah Supreme Court), decided that the
defendant had not abandoned her expectation of
privacy, but instead she had made "a mere
disclaimer of interest to avoid self-incrimination."
Id. at 736. However, in retrospect it appears that,
much like the defendant in Hodari, the defendant
in Rowe essentially tossed away her purse. Thus,
she abandoned her privacy interest in the purse.
Consequently, it appears that the United States
Supreme Court, sub silencio, reversed Rowe's
abandonment analysis and conclusion.
Accordingly, I believe our abandonment standard
to be incorrect and it is our duty to amend it to
comport with • Federal Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence on this issue. Of course, it is
possible that the Rowe standard comports with the
protections afforded under the Utah Constitution.
However, that question is not today before this
court and is best left to another time.
T[ 25 On appeal, Barlow renewed his suppression
argument. See id. The court, in analyzing his
claim, set forth the following standard to apply
when analyzing abandonment claims:
Under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361,
88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), no
warrantless search is lawful if the accused
manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the object searched.
One cannot, however,
manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy in an
item once it has been abandoned. The test for
determining when an object has been abandoned is
one of intent, which "may be inferred from words
spoken, acts done, and other objective facts." The
accused need not have abandoned the searched
item in the strict property sense, when an intent to
relinquish ownership must be shown; merely an
intent voluntarily to relinquish his privacy interest
is sufficient. A defendant has abandoned his
reasonable expectation of privacy when he leaves
an item in a public place.
Barlow, 17 F.3d at 88 (citations omitted). In
applying this standard, the court determined that "it
was reasonable [for the officer] to assume that the

car had been abandoned, and the officer was
justified in searching the car to identify its owner."
Id. In so concluding, the court stated that "[t]he only
relevant
*824
facts
in
determining
the
reasonableness of Barlow's privacy expectation are
the location of the vehicle, its condition, the time
..., and other factors that might have indicated an
intent to relinquish ownership." Id. at 89. [FN5]
FN5. The court also found that "[t]he only fact
weighing against the conclusion that the vehicle
had been abandoned was that it was still warm."
United States v. Barlow, 17 F.3d 85, 89 (5th
Cir.1994). However, even taking the warm hood
into account, the court concluded that "a police
officer who discovers an unlocked car at the end of
a public street with the key in the ignition could
reasonably conclude that the car had been
abandoned." Id. Thus, the court determined that
under the circumstances, signs of recent use were
not sufficient to revive a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
U 26 In Oswald, the defendant's car "burst into
flames" while he was driving through rural
Tennessee.
Oswald, 783 F.2d at 664.
The
defendant pulled the car to the roadside and leapt
from the car, leaving the key in the ignition and a
briefcase full of cocaine in the trunk. See id. A
passing motorist stopped and offered to help,
however, the defendant instead asked the driver to
take him to a telephone. See id. The defendant then
left the scene in the car of the passing motorist, an
act that was witnessed by a number of others in the
area. See id. Soon thereafter, local fire and police
officials responded to the burning car, and, after the
flames were extinguished, the police officer
searched the car, finding, among other things, the
case containing the cocaine. See id. at 664-65.
TI 27 The officer transferred the items he had found
to his patrol car's trunk, took the key (and the
steering column to which the key was fused after the
fire) and continued prosecuting his duties. See id. at
665. Approximately two hours later, knowing full
well that the car's owner or driver had neither
reported the fire, nor returned to the scene, the
officer began to search the items collected from the
car. See id. Among the belongings, the officer first
discovered the defendant's identification, and then
the officer pried the briefcase open, discovering a
large quantity of cocaine. See id. Some time later,
the defendant was arrested and charged with
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possession with intent to distribute, whereupon he
moved to suppress the evidence pulled from his car
See id The trial court demed the motion, and the
defendant entered a conditional guilty plea See id
U 28 On appeal, the defendant renewed his
argument See id The court, in examining the
issue, stated, "[w]hether property has been
'abandoned,' in this sense does not depend on where
legal title rests, or whether one asserting a Fourth
Amendment right has a legally enforceable
possessory interest in the property, the question,
rather, is whether the person claiming the protection
of the Fourth Amendment 'has a legitimate
expectation of privacy m the mvaded place ' " Id
at 666 (quotmg Rakas v Illinois, 439 U S 128,
143, 99 S Ct 421, 430, 58 L Ed 2d 387 (1978))
The court farther stated that "[n]ot only will privacy
expectations vary with the type of property
involved, but they will vary with the location of the
property " Id at 666-67 (citation omitted), see
Hester v United States, 265 U S 57, 59, 44 S Ct
445, 446, 68 L Ed 898 (1924) (establishing the
"open fields" doctrine, wherein Fourth Amendment
protections are diminished m open fields) Thus,
"[o]ne who [chooses] to leave luggage in an
unlocked burned-out automobile at the side of a
highway in the country can fairly be thought to have
a much lower expectation of privacy " Oswald, 783
F 2d at 666 Moreover, the fact that "the person
happens to be guilty of a crime" does not change the
fact that it is reasonable to conclude that a person is
considered to have abandoned any reasonable
expectation of privacy when they fail to come
forward within a short, but reasonable time to claim
their property
Id,
see United States v
Ramapuram, 632 F 2d 1149, 1155 (4th Cir 1980)
("It is sufficient here to observe that whatever
expectation of privacy attends a closed but
unsecured 'effect' generally is diminished where the
'effect' itself is placed in an area totally without the
protection of the Fourth Amendment such as m an
open field ")
U 29 In conjunction with Barlow and Oswald, I also
believe Ramapuram to be instructive, not, however,
on the issue of abandonment, but instead regarding
the existence of a reasonable or legitimate
expectation of privacy
In Ramapuram, the
defendant was accused of stealmg 100 sticks of
dynamite, *825 which federal agents subsequently
discovered during a warrantless search
See

Ramapuram, 632 F 2d at 1151 The defendant had
secreted the dynamite in "the trunk of a Chevrolet
automobile which was parked in a field on a farm
located in Baltimore County, Maryland, and owned
by [the defendant's] father " Id The court
described the car as a 'junker," but noted that it was
titled in the name of the defendant's father, for the
benefit of his son, thus, the court treated the
defendant as the owner of the car Id at 1152, 1156
n 12 The car itself was without "current state
licence tags, the trunk lock assembly had been
removed and the doors were unlocked " Id at 1152
After examining these circumstances, the court
determined that the defendant "had no reasonable
expectation of privacy" m the car, the contents of its
trunk, or its passenger compartment See id at
1153 The court based this conclusion, m part, on
the fact that ' the thrust of the Fourth Amendment
simply does not extend to locations lackmg a
foundation for reasonably expectmg that the
materials will be accorded privacy " Id The court
further stated that " '[w]hat is a reasonable
expectation of privacy is by definition related to
time, place and circumstance ' " Id at 1154
(citation omitted)
The court then invoked the
United States Supreme Court's test for determining
whether a legitimate expectation of privacy "has
been invaded by government action " Id at 1154
(quotations and citation omitted)
" 'This inquiry, as Mr Justice Harlan aptly noted
m his Katz concurrence, normally embraces two
discrete questions
The first is whether the
individual, by his conduct, has "exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,"
whether, m the words of the Katz majority, the
individual has shown that 'he seeks to preserve
[something] as private " The second question is
whether the individual's subjective expectation of
privacy is "one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable,' " whether, in the words
of the Katz majority, the individual's expectation,
viewed objectively, is 'justifiable" under the
circumstances ' "
Id (citations omitted)
K 30 The court then determined that because, (1) the
car had been left in an open field, and (2) under the
logic supporting the " 'automobile exception,' " and
based on ' the actual characteristics of the container"
involved, the defendant had no legitimate or
reasonable expectation of privacy in the car or its
interior
Id at 1155-56
Finally, the court
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examined the impact of the defendant's ownership
status on his expectations, and concluded that
ownership, in and of itself, was insufficient to
change the outcome. See id. Instead, the court
focused on the defendant's failure to secure the
vehicle, either its doors or its trunk, and the fact the
defendant did not live on the property where the car
was sitting. See id. Thus, the court concluded that
the trial court had not erred in denying defendant's
motion to suppress. See id.; see also State v.
Rubert,
2001
WL
1285939,
*3,
2001
Tenn.Crim.App. LEXIS 853, **8, 9 (stating
"[w]hen an individual flees from a vehicle, he or she
is deemed to have abandoned the vehicle, thereby
losing an expectation of privacy in that vehicle").
U 31 I believe these cases are much more salient to
the instant case. Moreover, rather than assuming
that Rynhart had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of her purse merely because it was a
purse, I believe we must examine the totality of the
circumstances to • determine whether, under these
circumstance, any such expectation would have been
legitimate.
We will only conclude that the
expectation was legitimate "if the individual
exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of
privacy and [the person's] actual expectation is one
that society recognizes as reasonable." People v.
Taylor, 253 Mich.App. 399, 655 N.W.2d 291,
296-97 (2002). "To determine whether [Rynhart]
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in [either
her purse or her van] sufficient to challenge the
search under the Fourth Amendment, we must
inquire whether [Rynhart] 'took the normal
precautions to maintain her privacy—that is,
precautions normally taken by those seeking
privacy.' " Id. (citations omitted); see also Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152- 55, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58
L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating
"the Court has examined whether a *826 person
invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment
took normal precautions to maintain his privacy"
(citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11,
97 S.Ct. 2476, 2483, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977))).
K 32 In this case, following an accident resulting in
her van coming to rest on the property of another,
Rynhart chose to leave the van where it sat. She left
it unlocked, illegally parked, and in an uncovered,
open field. The analysis is thus guided by the
objective fact that any expectation of privacy
Rynhart may have had in the vehicle is reduced, as a

matter of law, because the object in question is an
automobile. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 303, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1302, 143 L.Ed.2d 408
(1999) (noting that drivers and passengers "possess
a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to
property that they transport in cars, which 'trave[l]
public thoroughfares.' " (alterations in original)
(citation omitted)); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 569-71, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1985-86, 114 L.Ed.2d
619 (1991) (discussing the nature of the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment). [FN6] Second, Rynhart left the van
in an open field, which, as earlier noted, is not
subject to the protections afforded hearth and home
under the Fourth Amendment. See Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59, 44 S.Ct. 445, 446, 68
L.Ed. 898 (1924); see also Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1741, 80
L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (affirming Hester and its
principle that no legitimate expectation of privacy
arises in open fields). Thus, Rynhart left her
vehicle-which traditionally enjoys reduced Fourth
Amendment protections~in a field, which enjoys
none. She left the vehicle, and its contents, illegally
parked and unsecured for several hours following
her accident.
FN6. In citing the automobile exception, I in no
way mean to assert that the search was justifiable
under this exception. Rather, I point to the
automobile exception to highlight one of the factors
that suggest Rynhart abandoned any legitimate
expectation of privacy she may have had under
these circumstances.
H 33 In behaving in this fashion, Rynhart, much
like the defendant in Ramapuram, " 'exhibited [no]
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,' " in that,
through her actions, she made no effort to "seek to
preserve [something] as private." Ramapuram, 632
F.2d at 1154 (alterations in original) (citation
omitted); see Pierre v. State, 732 So.2d 376, 379
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999)
("
'Sometimes
an
automobile takes on the characteristics of a man's
castle. Other times an automobile takes on the
characteristics of an overcoat-that is, it is moveable
and can be discarded by the possessor at will.' ")
(quoting Thorn v. State, 248 Ark. 180, 450 S.W.2d
550 (1970)); [FN7] see also State v. Bradford, 25
Ariz.App. 518, 544 P.2d 1119, 1120 (1976)
(concluding that the defendant abandoned his vehicle
when he "fled after attempting to elude a pursuing
police car and crashed into a shed on private
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property"); Walker v. State, 228 Ga.App. 509, 493
S.E.2d 193, 194- 95 (1997) (concluding that the
defendant voluntarily abandoned his vehicle when he
left it parked on the roadside in anticipation of an
encounter with *827 the police);
Hunt v.
Commonwealth,
488 S.W.2d
692, 693-94
(Ky.Ct.App.1972) (concluding that the defendant
abandoned his vehicle after he ran from the police
and left his vehicle in a public park for four hours
without making any effort to retrieve it); cf. People
v. Hall, 5 Cal.App.3d 116, 122, 85 Cal.Rptr. 188,
191-92 (Cal.Ct.App.1970); State v. Rubert, 2001
WL 1285939, *3* 2001 Tenn.Crim.App. LEXIS
853, **8, 9 (Tenn.Crim.App. October 25, 2001)
("When an individual flees from a vehicle, he or she
is deemed to have abandoned the vehicle, thereby
losing an expectation of privacy in that vehicle.").
FN7. The instant case is not dissimilar to State v.
Wynn, 623 So.2d 848 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993). In
Wynn, police officers were investigating a possible
drug transaction when they noticed two illegally
parked vehicles, one of which was the defendant's
truck. See id. at 848. The officers also noticed
known, drug dealers standing near the vehicles
talking 'with the occupants. See id. After ttie
officers approached, and the drug dealers fled, the
defendant "got out of the truck and departed
without saying anything to the officers." Id. He
"left his truck unlocked and illegally parked....
After forty-five minutes, during which time no one
returned to the truck, the officer entered the truck
to search for identification or registration." Id. at
848-49. "During this search, the officer saw a
balled-up brown paper bag on the floorboard,
opened it, and discovered a large quantity of
cocaine in individual plastic bags." Id. at 849. On
appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress, the Florida Court of Appeals determined
that the defendant had abandoned any expectation
of privacy he may have had in the vehicle, thus the
search did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
See id. at 849; see also Simmons v. State, 118
S.W.3d 136 (Ark.App.2003) (concluding that the
defendant abandoned his privacy interests in a
container when he discarded it as he fled from the
police); State v. Kauffman, 162 Or.App. 402, 986
P.2d 696, 699 (1999) (concluding that the
defendant abandoned his privacy interest when he
ceded control of the involved container to a third
party and "asked them to hide the bag in the bushes
on property that did not belong to him").
^| 34 Furthermore, from the available case law, it
seems clear that whether or not Rynhart had a

subjective expectation of privacy in her vehicle,
when she left it as she did, she created a situation
wherein society is not prepared to recognize her
expectation as reasonable. See Ramapuram, 632
F.2d at 1154 ("The second question is whether the
individual's subjective expectation of privacy is 'one
that society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable," ' whether, in the words of the Katz
majority, the individual's expectation, viewed
objectively, is 'justifiable' under the circumstances."
(citations omitted)); see also United States v.
Barlow, 17 F.3d 85, 88-89 (5th Or. 1994)
(discussing voluntary relinquishment of a person's
legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle);
accord United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663,
666-67 (6th Cir.1986);
People v. Hall, 5
Cal.App.3d
116, 122, 85 Cal.Rptr.
188
(Cal.Ct.App.1970); State v. Wynn, 623 So.2d 848,
848-49 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993); Walker v. State,
228 Ga.App. 509, 493 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1997);
Hunt v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 692, 694
(Ky.Ct.App.1972);
State
v.
Rubert,
No.
M2000-00914-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1285939, *3,
2001 Tenn.Crim.App.
LEXIS
853,
**8-9
(Tenn.Crim.App. October 25, 2001); cf. State v.
Bradford, 25 Ariz.App. 518, 544 P.2d 1119, 1120
(1976) (vehicle deemed to be abandoned following
an accident from which the defendant fled);
Commonwealth v. Sinclair, No. 1018-01-2, 2001
WL 1117050, *3, 2001 Va.App. LEXIS 527, **7-8
(Va.Ct.App. September 25, 2001). I can discern no
significant difference between the instant case and
the aforementioned cases.
Thus, there is no
principled reason to conclude that society is
prepared to recognize Rynhart's
subjective
expectation of privacy.
^ 35 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that
Rynhart's actions did not demonstrate her wholesale
failure "to preserve [something] as private,"
Ramapuram, 632 F.2d at 1154 (alteration in
original), I would conclude Rynhart's action resulted
in the reasonable conclusion that she abandoned her
expectation of privacy, even under existing Utah
law. [FN8]
FN8. This court, in State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730,
736 (Utah Ct.App 1991), rev'd, 850 P 2d 427
(Utah 1992), made the remarkable statement that
abandonment is "primarily a factual question of
intent." However, not only do I believe that the
abandonment issue in Rowe was erroneously
decided, see State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,
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1269 (Utah 1993), I see nothing to support this
court's decision to separate Fourth Amendment
abandonment analysis from our normal Fourth
Amendment analysis. Abandonment should be
reviewed as "a mixed question of law and fact."
United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 665-66
(6th. Cir.1986). Thus, as we do in all other search
and seizure cases involving the review of a trial
court's suppression decision, we should review the
trial court's factual findings for clear error, and its
conclusions of law for correctness. See State v.
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) ("A
finding not supported by substantial, competent
evidence must be rejected.");
id. at 689
("Generally, whether the requisite voluntariness
exists depends on 'the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances.' " (citation omitted));
State v. Navanick, 1999 UT App 265,T[ 7, 987
P.2d 1276 ("The trial court's legal conclusions
[made regarding a motion to suppress], however,
we review for correctness.").
Admittedly,
"[v]oluntariness is primarily a factual question,"
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262, however, the trial
court's
ultimate
conclusion
concerning
voluntariness is reviewed for correctness. See id. at
1271.
Similarly, I believe that when the central issue is
whether or not the defendant has abandoned his
reasonable expectation of privacy in a container,
vehicle,' or other object, "the trial court's
underlying factual findings [should] not be set
aside unless they are clearly erroneous," but the
court's ultimate legal conclusion concerning
abandonment should be granted no deference and
should be reviewed for correctness. Id.; see also
State v. South, 932 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah
Ct.App. 1997) ("We review for correctness the trial
court's legal conclusions on motions to suppress.
We will overturn the trial court's underlying
factual findings only if those findings are clearly
erroneous." (citation omitted)).
In the instant case, the trial court made very few
factual findings concerning this issue, and very few
of the facts were subject to any dispute. The court
found that a property owner called the Box Elder
Sheriff's Department to report a van had been left
on his property. The owner further reported that
the van had crashed through two fences and come
to rest in a marsh. The record supports this
finding. The court further found that the vehicle
had been in the marsh for over five hours, and the
record also supports this finding. The final two
findings relevant to this issue were (1) that the
State failed to introduce evidence "of the state of
the vehicle," and (2) that the vehicle's owner did
not have sufficient time to make arrangements to
retrieve the vehicle.
Nothing in the record
supports the second finding. Thus, in the absence

of "substantial, competent evidence," this finding
must be reversed. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687.
Moreover, given the other facts available to the
trial court, I am uncertain of the materiality of the
vehicle's condition. Furthermore, the undisputed
facts, left undiscussed by the trial court include:
(1) Rynhart left the van and its contents unsecured,
(2) Rynhart did not report the accident or the
location of the vehicle to the authorities, (3)
Rynhart did not inform the property owner of the
accident or tell him that she was leaving the van on
his property, and (4) Rynhart left the scene of the
accident, was not hospitalized, and was able to find
her way to the impound lot later in the day to
collect the vehicle. There was also no evidence,
and Rynhart does not argue, that her decision to
leave was in any way influenced by the police,
removing any possibility that her flight was
coerced. See, e.g., United States v. Flynn, 309
F.3d 736, 738 (10th Cir.2002). Consequently, I
would conclude that Rynhart's behavior was
voluntary as a matter of law.
I would also conclude, again after focusing on the
totality of the circumstances, that Rynhart
abandoned any legitimate expectation of privacy
that she may have otherwise had when she left the
van as she did. Following the single car accident,
during which Rynhart careened through two
fences, the van came to rest in a field or marsh.
Said field was not owned by Rynhart, nor was it
intended (in that it is a marsh) as a parking area.
Rynhart- left the van and neither reported the
accident to the police, nor did she inform the
property owner of the accident or her decision to
leave the van. Furthermore, when she left, she did
not secure the van or its contents, she left an open
bottle of liquor in the van, easily seen by anyone
passing by, and she left the van where it had come
to rest for over five hours. Thus, Rynhart's failure
"to seek to preserve [the materials in the van] as
private," United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d
1149, 1154 (4th Cir.1980), doomed her motion to
suppress. She either had no expectation of privacy
that society was prepared to recognize, or she
voluntarily abandoned whatever expectation she
had, as a matter of law.
*828 In Utah, "the abandonment determination
[currently] involves two inquiries: (1) whether the
individual relinquished a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the item;
and (2) whether the
relinquishment was voluntary." State v. Bissegger,
2003 UT App 2 5 6 4 14, 76 P.3d 178. Moreover,
again under our case law, " '[t]he burden of proving
abandonment falls on the state, ... and must be
shown by clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence. *
" Id. (quoting Slate v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 736
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^ 36 Here, the van had been involved in a single car
accident. After crashing through a fence, it came to
rest in a marsh, owned by someone other than
Rynhart.
Following the accident, Rynhart, for
reasons unclear from the record, got out of the van,
leaving her purse, briefcase, and a half-consumed
bottle of liquor, and left the scene. She left the van
unlocked, its contents fully available to any curious
passerby. She reported the accident to neither the
police, nor the property owner. Over five hours
later, the police were called to the accident by the
property owner, yet Rynhart had made no effort to
contact the authorities. Therefore, even if we were
to assume that Rynhart maintained a legitimate
privacy interest in the van immediately following the
accident, the record clearly reflects that Rynhart
relinquished her privacy interest in the van and its
contents. See Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256 at ^ 14,
76 P.3d 178; cf. California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 41, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1629, 100 L.Ed.2d 30
(1988) (stating "the police cannot reasonably be
expected to avert th£ir eyes from evidence of
criminal activity that could have been observed by
any member of the public," and " 'what a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection' " (citation and alteration
omitted)).
If 37 It is also clear from the record that the
relinquishment was her own decision and not the
product of official coercion or force. Cf. State v.
Vancleave, 2001 UT App 228,U 12, 29 P.3d 680
(equating voluntariness to being " 'free from official
coercion' " in the context of waiver of counsel
(citation omitted)), cert, denied, 40 P.3d 1135;
accord United States v. Flynn, 309 F.3d 736, 738
(10th Cir.2002) ("In order to be effective,
abandonment must be voluntary. It is considered
involuntary if *829 it results from a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.... [P]roperty is considered to
have been involuntarily abandoned if the defendant
discards it as a consequence of illegal police
conduct." (citations omitted)); Hypolite v. State,

985 S.W.2d 181, 187 (Tex.App. 1998) ("In order for
an abandonment to occur, the decision to abandon
must not be the product of police misconduct.");
Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 2001 WL 1117050, *2,
2001 Va.App. LEXIS 527, *7 (Va.Ct.App.
September 25, 2001) ("[I]ntention is a prime factor
in determining whether there has been an
abandonment. And courts must determine intent ...
from the objective facts at hand. Abandonment may
be demonstrated, for example, when a suspect
leaves an object unattended in a public place."
(second alteration in original) (quotations and
citations omitted)).
^ 38 In this case, at the time Rynhart crashed
through the fence, she was not, in any way,
involved with the police, nor was the police
department even aware of the accident until over
five hours after it occurred. Thus, her decision was
neither the product of police coercion or any other
police misconduct, and was, accordingly, made
voluntarily.
As a result, Rynhart voluntarily
relinquished any legitimate expectation of privacy in
her vehicle in leaving it as she did following the
accident. Consequently, the officer's search of the
vehicle did not, in any way, violate Rynhart's
Fourth Amendment rights.
K 39 For the foregoing reasons, I believe that the
abandonment standard we have adopted in Utah is
flawed and contrary to generally accepted Fourth
Amendment abandonment analysis. At a minimum,
we should abandon the subjective approach to the
analysis in favor of an objective analysis of intent.
However, whether analyzed under the generally
accepted standard, or under our flawed approach, I
believe that Rynhart abandoned her expectation of
privacy in the van. Thus, the trial court's order
should be affirmed. Accordingly, I dissent from the
majority decision to suppress the evidence
discovered during the search.
81 P.3d 814, 487 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2003 UT
App 410
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Addendum B

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 021100039 FS

Plaintiff,
vs.

TANJA RYNHART,
11680 North Rocky Point Rd.
Bothwell, UT 84337
DOB: 02/25/66

HON. BEN H. HADFIELD

Defendant.

This matter comes before the court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant
seeks to suppress evidence found in her purse when an officer searched it on finding it in her
vehicle. On 6 January 2002 a property owner who happens to be the Box Elder County Sheriff
called officer Bumham about a vehicle that had jumped the curb, crashed through two fences
and came to rest off the road in a marsh. Upon investigating, Officer Burnham discovered that
the vehicle had been there at least five or six hours and that the driver was not anywhere near
the vehicle. Officer Burnham searched the vehicle and the purse in an effort to determine who
the driver was.
The Defendant frames the issue as whether the officer conducted a proper search

be determined from the facts and circumstances). The burden of
proving abandonment falls on the state, People v. Contreras, 210 Cal.
App. 3d 450, 259 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (1989), and must be shown by
"clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence.'1 Friedman v. United States,
341 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 1965). See also United States v. Boswell,
347 A.2d 270, 274 (D.C. 1975); O'Shaughnessy v. State, 420 So. 2d
377, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). It "is measured from the vantage
point" of the defendant, [** 19] and not the police. Narain v. State, 79
Md. App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158, 1161 n.4 (1989). "It is only the
[defendant's] state of mind that counts." Id.

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, (Utah Ct. App. 1991) rev'don other grounds State v. Rowe, 850
P.2d 427 (Utah 1992). Applying the standards set forth in Rowe, the court must conclude that
the State has failed to carry its burden to show abandonment. The officer inspected the vehicle
at 8:30 in the morning and determined that it had been in the marsh since at least 3:00 a.m. that
morning. The owner or driver would not have had time to make arrangements to retrieve the
vehicle if it was damaged. The State failed to present any evidence of the state of the vehicle.
If the vehicle could be driven, then the officer may have been more justified in believing that
it had been abandoned. Although there clearly had been an accident, it appears that no other
vehicles were involved. The apparent early hour, the winter conditions, and the single vehicle
nature of the accident all combine to belie the officer's imputing an intent to abandon the
vehicle.
The court does find, however, that the community caretaker function of the officer
was properly invoked here. The accident occurred around 3:00 a.m. on a cold January night.
The absence of the driver made it imperative that the officer identify the driver so that he or she

could be found. The driver could have been in distress and lost or disoriented. The officer
acted appropriately in attempting to determine who was the driver. Although the Defendant
makes a good point that the owner of the vehicle could be ascertained by using the license plate
number, the owner and the driver are not necessarily the same person, and the officer had a duty
to ascertain the facts in order to preserve life in the event the driver had wandered off and was
lost. As such, all three prongs of the Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 994 P.2d
1283 (2000) test are satisfied. (1) The officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that
an emergency existed - a vehicle involved in an accident in the early morning hours that had
been left by its driver.

(2) The officer testified that the search was for the purpose of

ascertaining who was the driver so that the motivation was not primarily to arrest or seize
evidence, and (3) it was reasonable to search the purse in connection with the emergency.
The motion to suppress is denied. Counsel for the State shall prepare an order in
conformance with this decision.

Dated this

0 I

day of

h*.

, 20OJL

By the court

Judge Ben H. Hadfield
District Judge
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§ 4 1 - 6 - 3 2 . Collision with unattended vehicle or other property—Duties of
operator—Penalty
(l)(a) The operator of a vehicle that collides with or is involved in an
accident with any vehicle or other property that is unattended and that resiilts
in damage to the other vehicle or property shall immediately stop and shall:
(i) locate and notify the operator or owner of the vehicle or the owner of
other property of the operator's name and address and the registration:
number of the vehicle causing the damage; or
(ii) attach securely in a conspicuous place on the vehicle or ofhei:
property a written notice giving the operator's name and address and the*
registration number of the vehicle causing the damage,
(b) If applicable, the operator shall also give notice under Subsections
41-6-31(2) and (3).
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Laws 1941, c. 52, § 22; Laws 1977, c. 269, § 2; Laws 1987, c. 138, § 26; Laws 1999,vc.
44, § 3, eff.May3, 1999.
Codifications C 1943, § 57-7-99.
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